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


The Latest Book in the *Get Strong at Go* Series

Get Strong at the Endgame


The endgame is a crucial phase of the game of Go. However, it is also the most difficult and requires the hardest work. Not only must you accurately calculate many distinct positions throughout the board, you must also take into account the inter-relationships between them. Every miscalculation will cost you points, and in a close game these points can be the difference between victory and defeat.

Get Strong at the Endgame is the book that will bring the level of your endgame skill to that of a dan player. Even though the endgame is the hardest part of go, the nearly 300 problems in this book will make studying the endgame easy for you.


The first part starts out with nearly 100 problems in which you are asked to calculate the value of an endgame move. For example, do you know how much Black 1 in each of the three diagrams below is worth? Since these positions result from commonly played josekis, it will save you time in your games if you have memorized their values.



The second part of this book contains 100 problems on endgame tesujis. For example, in the position in *Dia. 1* below, crawling with Black 1 is usually the correct endgame move. But here, because of the thinness of White's position, the placement of Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is worth two additional points and Black ends in sente as well.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

In the final set of problems you are asked to find the best endgame sequence in positions on an 11 x 11 board. For example, in the problem in *Dia. 3*, what are the values of all the remaining endgame points from 'a' to 'e'? Which is the biggest and which is the smallest? What is the best endgame sequence for White? The best endgame sequence for Black?



Dia. 3

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Cover: An oban print by Toshusai Sharaku depicting the famed sumo (Japanese wrestler) apprentice Daidosan Bungoro holding a go board when he was eight years old. (From the collection of Mizuguchi Fujio.)

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Go World News

Japanese Go

44th Oza Tournament: Ryu Shikun takes the title from O Rissei

Ryu Shikun has taken his second concurrent title by defeating O Rissei 3-0 in the Oza title match. In the first two games, held on October 22 and November 5, O was forced to resign. In the third, played on November 14, Ryu, playing Black, won by 2 1/2 points.

The top seven Japanese titles are now monopolized by three players: Cho Chikun with three and Yoda and Ryu with two each.

22nd Tengen Tournament: Rin Kaiho challenges Ryu Shikun for the title

The redoubtable Rin Kaiho, who has now been a top player for 30 years, is giving Ryu Shikun a tough time in the 22nd Tengen title match. After four games, the match is tied two-all and everything will be decided in the final game, scheduled for December 26.

Rin made a bad start, losing the first game by 6 1/2 points, but he bounced back with successive wins in the second and third games. That put him one win away from regaining the title Ryu took from him two years ago, but Ryu showed his mettle in the fourth game and evened the series.

The results:

Game 1 (Nov. 8). Ryu (B) by 6 1/2 points.

Game 2 (Nov. 21). Rin (B) by 1 1/2 points.

Game 3 (Dec. 12). Rin (W) by 3 1/2 points.

Game 4 (Dec. 19). Ryu (W) by 3 1/2 points.

Late news. The final game, played on December 26, was won by Ryu Shikun who thus won the title for the third year in a row.

Kobayashi Satoru to challenge Cho Chikun for the Kisei title

In the best-of-three playoff to decide the challenger for the Kisei title, Kobayashi Satoru defeated Ryu Shikun with two straight wins on November 18 and 25, 1996. The first game of the title match will be played on January 15-16, 1997 in Hawaii.

This will be Kobayashi's second challenge to Cho for this title, and he is perhaps Cho's most dangerous opponent. Two years ago he wrested the title from Cho only to lose it back to him last year.

35th Judan tournament

The double-elimination tournament to decide the challenger to the Judan title has reached the final stages. Yamada Kimio, a 24-year-old 7-dan, has won the winner's section. Among players 7-dan and above, Yamada has the best winning percentage this year: 81%,



A victorious Ryu Shikun and a dejected Rin Kaiho just after the completion of the first game of the 22nd Tengen title match.

The 52nd Honinbo League. Title holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		RS	KM	YK	KS	RK	HN	KH	CS	Won	Lost
1	Ryu Shikun			○			●	○		2	1
2	Kato Masao				●	○			○	2	1
3	Yo Kagen	●					●	○		1	2
4	Kataoka Satoshi		○			●			●	1	2
5	Rin Kaiho		●		○				●	1	2
5	Hikosaka Naoto	○		○				●		2	1
5	Komatsu Hideki	●		●			○			1	2
5	Cho Sonjin		●		○	○				2	1

with 47 wins to 11 losses. Kato Masao won the losers' section by beat Kobayashi Koichi. Yamada and Kato will now meet in the play-off in early January to decide who will challenge Yoda Norimoto for the title.

52nd Honinbo League

The league to decide the challenger for the Honinbo title next year is well under way with the first three rounds having been completed. With four rounds left to play, the race is wide open. Four players, Ryu Shikun, Kato Masao, Hikosaka Naoto and Cho Sonjin are leading with two wins against one loss. The four other players each have one win against two losses (see chart above).

22nd Meijin League

The places in the 22nd Meijin league have been decided. Takemiya Masaki, who lost the

title to Cho, will be the top-ranked contender. Following him are O Rissei, Kato Masao, Kobayashi Koichi, and Rin Kaiho.

Yoda Norimoto, who turned in a miserable performance in the last league, losing all his games, has won his place back again this year. Another notable entry is Ryu Shikun. The third vacant place has been taken by Yo Kagen.

15th Women's Honinbo Tournament Yoshida Mika Defends Her Title.

Yoshida Mika defended the Women's Honinbo title for the third time by defeating Nakazawa Ayako three straight in a best-of-five match.

In the first game, played on October 7, Yoshida (White) won by 5 1/2 points. The following week, on October 12, she won the second game by 2 1/2 points to take a two-

The 22nd Meijin League. Title holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		TM	OR	KM	KK	KS	RK	YN	RS	YK	Won	Lost
1	Takimiya Masaki							●		○	1	1
2	O Rissei									○	1	0
3	Kato Masao					●					0	1
4	Kobayashi Koichi					○		○			2	0
5	Kataoka Satoshi			○	●						1	1
6	Rin Kaiho										0	0
7	Yoda Norimoto	○			●						1	1
7	Ryu Shikun										0	0
7	Yo Kagen	●	●								0	2

game lead in the match. Then, on October 21, she went on to win the third game and defend her title by forcing Nakazawa (Black) to resign after 246 moves. This is the fourth straight term that Yoshida has won this title.

Obituary

Death of Asada Shizuo

We very much regret to have to inform readers of the death of Asada Shizuo, President of the International Go Federation and also President of the Nihon Ki-in. Mr. Asada died on November 8, aged 85. He will be remembered for his great contributions to popularizing the game of go internationally.

Mr. Asada was President of Japan Airlines from 1971 to 1981, during which time he inaugurated major new JAL routes to the U.S.S.R. and China. During the Dubai (1971) and Dacca (1977) hijackings of JAL airliners, he took charge of on-the-spot negotiations with the hijackers and helped to resolve the crises peacefully.

Mr. Asada played an important role in JAL's corporate sponsorship of go. He was instrumental in founding the World Amateur Go Championship in 1979 and he served as the first president of the International Go Federation from its founding in 1984 until his death. In 1986 he became the 19th Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in, a post he held until 1993, when he became the 7th President. Mr. Asada held an amateur 6-dan diploma.

International Go

11th China-Japan Super Go

This year's Super Go series turned into a complete rout for the Japanese team by the young Chinese player, Chang Hao 7-dan, who wreaked havoc on last year's team.

Japan got off to a good start when Hane Naoki 6-dan, son of the Hane Yasumasa, put Japan into the lead by winning two games, but he then lost to Chang Hao in a close contest by only 2 1/2 points.

In the fifth and sixth games, played on October 5 and 7 in Tokyo at the Nihon Ki-in, Chang disposed of two of Japan's star players, O Rissei and Ryu Shikun. Then, on November 10th he took out another Japanese title holder,

Yoda Norimoto. In the final two games, played on December 27 and 29, he defeated both Kobayashi Satoru and Otake Hideo, thus winning the series for the Chinese team.

Lee Chang-ho wins the World's Strongest Player Tournament

The final game of the Japan-China-Korea Meijin tournament, also called the World's Strongest Player Tournament, was played between Takemiya Masaki and Lee Chang-ho in Seoul on October 18, 1996. Lee, playing Black, won by 8 1/2 points to sweep this series with four straight wins. Takemiya ended with a score of two wins against two losses, and Ma Xiaochun lost all four of his games.

First LG Cup: World Baduk Championship

A new international go tournament has been inaugurated by a Korean corporation known as the LG Group. The first prize is 200,000,000 won (about \$250,000) and second prize about \$60,000. This is the third most lucrative international tournament after the Samsung Cup (see pages 13 to 20) and the Ing Cup (pages 7 to 12). All games are played with a 5 1/2 point komi and each player has three hours to make his moves. The tournament started out with 31 players, eight from Japan, 14 from Korea, six from mainland China, two from Taiwan, and one from the United States. All the Japanese title holders were present, as well as Kobayashi Koichi and Yuki Satoshi, but after two rounds had been played only Kobayashi Satoru remained in the best eight. Among the big names that got knocked out in the first two rounds, held on June 25 and 27, were Nie Weiping, Kobayashi Koichi, Takemiya Masaki, Cho Chikun, Ryu Shikun, O Rissei, and Yoda Norimoto.

The quarterfinals were held on October 11, 1996 in New York. Lee Chang-ho defeated Kobayashi Satoru (Japan), Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea) beat Jiang Zhujiu (USA), Ma Xiaochun (China) beat Kim Seung-joon 4-dan (Korea), and Choi Myung-hoon 4-dan (Korea) beat Cho Hun-hyun (Korea).

Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk won their games semifinals on December 18 and will face each other in the final early next year.

Our coverage of international go continues on page 7.

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In the next game, Ishida Yoshio 9-dan plays in an active style with four handicap stones against Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan. And in the three-stone chapter, Takemiya Masaki 9-dan shows the use of his patented "cosmic go" against Ishikura Noburu 4-dan. The last chapter includes eight games with brief commentaries.

All of these games are analyzed in terms that weaker players can easily understand and tests are included to measure the reader's real strength. A special feature is the use of graphical symbols to highlight the moves that the reader should work hard to understand and incorporate into his own game in order to improve.

Here is a book that you can thoroughly enjoy while improving your game at the same time.

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The 3rd Ing Cup

Yoda Norimoto vs. Yoo Chang-hyuk

The Ing Cup is held every four years and, together with the newly founded Samsung Cup, it is the most lucrative of all go tournaments, with a first prize of \$400,000. It is sponsored by the Ing Chang-Ki Goe Educational Foundation, and one of its purposes is to popularize the SST rules of Goe, which were developed by Ing Chang-Ki. (A series of articles on these rules can be found in *Go World*, issues #70 to #73.)

The first three rounds were held on April 24, 26, and 28, 1996. For a change, players from the Nihon Ki-in did very well, with three, Cho Chikun, Rin Kaiho, and Yoda Norimoto, making it into the semifinals, against only one Korean, Yoo Chang-hyuk, who beat his compatriot Lee Chang-ho in the quarterfinals.

In the best-of-three semifinal matches, played from August 10 to 14, Yoo won his match against Rin by two straight games, while Yoda defeated Cho two games to one.

Everybody was watching the best-of-five final to see if Yoda could live up to his reputation as the 'Korean Killer'. He is the most-feared Japanese player among the Koreans, having won a majority of his games against their top players.

Yoo and Lee Chang-ho are the two strongest Koreans, while Yoda has established himself as one of the top players in Japan, holding the Judan and Gosei titles. Both players are 30 years old and in their prime, so this promised to be an exciting match.

Game One

White: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan

Komi: 8 points

Time: 3 hours 30 minutes each

Played in Xian, China on October 4, 1996.

Figure 1 (1–36). Yoo has a difficult game.

Yoda won the *nigiri*, so he probably chose White because of the large 8 point komi.

The moves to Black 9 were the same as

when Yoo and Yoda played in the LG Cup, but at White 10 Yoda played a different move.




Figure 1 (1–41)

According to Go Seigen, the referee, White 24 was a dubious move. It should have been played at A. Yoda knew this, but he wanted to take sente so as to make an approach move at 26. Black's response with the knight's move at 27, however, was bad. Yoo should have played this move at B or C. From this point on, the game became difficult for Yoo.





Figure 2 (41–112)

Figure 2 (37–112). A good game for Yoda

The hane at 42 was a severe move, but even if Black had played 41 at 1 in *Dia. 1* to avoid

it, White would still have gotten a good game after playing 6. The cause of Black's problems was his move at 27.



Dia. 1

The squeeze from 86 to 98 was a good result for White. Of course, Black could capture three stones with 66, 68, and 80, but White, in turn, could capture three black stones around 45 and 47 because Black is short of liberties.




Figure 1 (1-61). Yoda plays severely.

Before the second game, Yoda had been given an injection to stop diarrhea he was suffering from and he hadn't eaten anything. However, in spite of his bad physical condition, he still played an excellent game.

Black 19 was a slack move, lacking in fighting spirit. It should have been played higher and tighter at 91. Yoda's supporters attributed this slackness to his illness, but as the game went on, his spirit seemed to improve and his moves became very severe, as the two-step hane of Black 55 and 57 demonstrate. Resisting was impossible, so Yoo had to submissively play on the second line with White 60.




Figure 1 (1-61)

lead. Yoda had spent very little time. Since he wasn't feeling very well, he didn't have the stamina to engage in long thought and concentration.

After thinking for a long time, Yoo played 62, which was a very good response.

Go Seigen praised Black 63, but he said that it was not good for White to settle the corner with 68 and 70. Instead White should have attached at A.

However, it was now Yoda's turn to falter. The hane of Black 83 was not good — he should have played at B instead. Because of this slip, it later became apparent that his group would have trouble making eyes.




Figure 3 (101-180)





Figure 2 (61-100)

Figure 2 (61-100). A good game for Yoda

When Yoda capped at 61, Black was in the

Figure 3 (100-180). Yoda's illusion

Up to White 100, the game favored Black. But after that, the group at the bottom had to struggle for life and White began to catch up. According to Go Seigen, Yoda missed his chance to clinch the game by playing 107.



Dia. 1

Instead of Black 107, Yoda should have played 1 as in Dia. 1. After White 6, If Black

then played 7 and 9, he would clearly have had a won game. When White played 108 to 110, the game was up for grabs and to win required some very subtle play. After White 118, Black's group at the top became thin.

Both players were very tense during the large endgame stage, and the fateful moment arrived at 179. When Yoda saw Yoo play a move inside with 180, he felt very grateful and thought Yoo had made a mistake. If this game were played by the Japanese rules, this move would have been small, but in the Ing rules, it was big. If Yoda had played at D, captured with E, then connected in Figure 2, it would have still been a seki, but in the Ing counting, it would have been worth four points. That is, White would not have been able to play at C (180 in Figure 3), which would be worth another point, while Black could play at D and E, then connect between those two points for another three points. This was the margin of victory. Had Yoda played 179 at C, he would not have lost.

Figure 4 (181–275). White wins by 3 points.




Figure 4 (181–275)

109: left of 107; 169: right of 133; 170: at 93;
Black connects the final ko.

Game Three

White: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan

Played in Beijing on November 4, 1996.

Figure (1–109). A strong opening, but —

After such a bad showing by Japan in re-

cent international matches, Japanese go fans were praying for Yoda's victory. This support bolstered his confidence and he was sure that he would win.

In the morning session, he played extremely well, except for the last move he made before the lunch break (White 58). It was a slack move. Then when the game resumed in the afternoon, his moves were as if a different person were playing — they were hardly the moves of a title holder.




Figure (1–109)

72 and 78: take ko at 38; 75: takes ko at 51.

Moves after 109 omitted.

The ataris of White 26 and 48 were strong moves. White 44 at A would be the usual move. However, the combination of 44, together with 48 and 50, gave White a very good game. Moreover, White 56 was an excellent probe.

Go Seigen said that instead of 58, White should have invaded at B.

Black 65 was an all-out move. However, Yoda's moves at 66 and 68 did not meet Yoo's challenge and his moves were quite slack from this point on.

Whether good or bad, fighting spirit demanded that White 66 be played at C. After that it was too late to stop Yoda's descent into defeat.

Yoda spent nearly all of his allotted time (only 7 seconds were left on his clock at the end of the game), but try as he might, he could not reverse the course of this game.

Black wins by 5 points.

Game Four

White: Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Played in Beijing on November 6, 1996

Figure 1 (1–57). Yoda takes the lead.

Both players were under strong pressure and tense: Yoda, because he could not afford to lose another game; Yoo because he had to keep up his winning momentum. Perhaps this was the reason they played very quickly.




Figure 1 (1–57)

41: connects at 34

The attachment of 43 gave Black a thick position. After this he could play the powerful move at 57. Black now has both thickness and a lot of territory. All the professionals watching (including Go Seigen and Chang Hao) agreed that Yoda had the advantage.

Figure 2 (58–114). Yoda misses his chance.

Yoda kept up the pressure by playing two consecutive capping moves with Black 71 and 73. A young Chinese player commented that White 74 should have been at A, followed by Black B and White 81. Because of this move, Yoda was able to gouge out White's eye shape with the sequence from 75–81. White had to escape with the moves to 88, and his group ended up floating in the center.

Before lunch, Yoda played a magnificent game. His first mistake was Black 97. If he had played the sequence Black C–White D–Black E–White F–Black G–White H, the game would have been decided in Black's favor.

After forcing with White 98, Yoo captured with 100, and that took the pressure off his weak group at the bottom.

The game was still up in the air, however, and Yoo had to fight hard to win.





Figure 2 (58–114)

Against 111, Yoo should have immediately answered by playing at 114 with 112. White 112 could have been the losing move, but Yoda played safe with Black 113 instead of blocking at 114. He was afraid that his group was in danger, but if Black played 1 in Dia. 1, and White then jumped to 2, Black could attack the white group above with 3 and 5. Black could also connect at 'a' and the white group in the lower right would have been in greater danger than the black one.



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (115–252)
 93, 99, 128: take ko (right of 84);
 96, 102: take ko at 84; 110: connects at 31

Figure 2 (58–114). A game that Yoda should have won

After the game Yoda cried out, 'How could I have lost this game?'

In both the third and fourth games, he played brilliantly in the morning, but in the afternoon he played like a second rate 9-dan instead of the title holder he is.

Yoo, on the other hand, was so excited about his win that he was crying out of joy. He needed a handkerchief to wipe away his tears. This was his first victory in an international tournament since he won the Fujitsu Cup in 1993.

But Yoda swore that he would get his revenge against Yoo later in the month in the final of the Samsung Cup. As you will see in the following article, Yoda was true to his word.

White wins by 5 points.

(From *Go Weekly*, October 28 and November 25, 1996.

Translated by Richard Bozulich.)



Go Seigen, the referee for the match, analyzes the fourth game.

The 1st Samsung Cup Yoda's First World Championship



Yoda, wearing a traditional kimono, is deep in thought in the second game of the Samsung Cup final against yoo Chang-hyuk.

These days, the most dependable player for Japan in international go is Yoda Norimoto, holder of the Judan and Gosei titles. Yoda has finally lived up to the expectations of Japanese go fans by winning his first world championship, the 1st Samsung Cup World Open Baduk Championship. He defeated Yoo Chang-hyuk of Korea 2-1 in the final and so took revenge for his loss to the same player in the Ing Cup final. For Yoda, it was his first international triumph since he won the TV Asia Tournament in 1993, and it was Japan's first world championship since Otake won the Fujitsu Cup in 1992.

Recently, there has been a rush among top Korean companies to found international tournaments. Their motives seem to be a mixture of pride in the outstanding results of Korean players in international competition and a desire to capitalize on the

great popularity of go among Koreans. Go is the most popular hobby among men in their 40s and 50s, so providing an international stage for Lee Chang-ho is probably a smart move commercially.

Earlier this year, we saw the founding of the World's Strongest Player tournament, in which the holders of the Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Meijin titles play each other twice. This was founded by a Korean newspaper, the East Asia Daily, and started in May. (The result was a triumph for Lee.) It was soon followed by the LG Cup: The World Monarch of Go Tournament. This is an expanded version of a Korean domestic tournament, the Monarch of Go, which its main sponsor, the LG Group, decided to convert into an international tournament. (Three Korean players, Lee, Yoo, and Che Min-hoon have reached the semifinals; the

fourth player is Ma Xiaochun of China.)

The above two were then joined by yet another new international tournament: the Samsung Cup, which got off to a start in August. International tournaments usually have domestic preliminary rounds in which the participating countries choose their representatives; the unusual feature of this tournament is that it has an international preliminary tournament in which players from around the world compete to join seeded players in the main tournament. Moreover, players competing in the preliminary do so at their own expense, paying for their own transportation, accommodation, and meals. This is unheard-of for a professional tournament and, at least for the Japanese players concerned, was a novel experience. There was prize money of 700,000 won (about ¥100,000 or a little over \$1,000) for each win, so players who won a couple of games could at least recover their expenses (the preliminary was two rounds for some players, three rounds for others).

As the host country, Korea had the most seeded players, with seven, including their top foursome of Lee, Cho Hun-hyun, Yoo, and Seo). They were joined by the five Japanese title holders (Cho, Takemiya, Yoda, Ryu, and O Rissei), and four Chinese (Nie, Ma, Yu Bin, and Zhang Wendong).

Ten Japanese players participated in the preliminary tournament: Kobayashi Koichi, Kobayashi Satoru, Awaji, Kataoka, Yamashiro, O Meien, Ogata, Komatsu, Yo Kagen, and Yamada Kimio. They were chosen by ranking in the 1995 prize winners' list. The presence of Kobayashi Koichi among them was notable. During his reign as title holder, Kobayashi passed up a number of invitations to play in international tournaments, preferring to save his energy for domestic title matches, but now he has time on his hands. He had no trouble qualifying for the main tournament, along with the other Kobayashi, Kataoka, and Yamada.

The big news for Westerners was Rob van Zeijst's historic win against a Korean 6-dan, the first-ever victory by a Western amateur over a professional in a world championship.

Of the 94 players in the preliminary tour-

namment, five Koreans, four Japanese, four Chinese and one American (Jimmy Cha) qualified for the main tournament. The other American representative, Michael Redmond, ran into a fellow Oeda disciple, Yo Kagen, in the second round and lost. One amateur won his way into the main tournament: Liu Jun of China, the winner of this year's World Amateur Go Championship.

When Kobayashi Koichi continued with two wins in the main tournament, including one over Nie Weiping of China, it looked as if he was Japan's main hope, but he lost to Yang Jaeho of Korea in the quarterfinal. Japan's last chance was Yoda, who had justified his Korean nickname of 'the Korean killer' by defeating their former number one, Cho Hun-hyun, in the second round.

In the semifinals, Yoo defeated Lee (he also defeated him in the Ing Cup) and Yoda defeated Yang, so the final became a replay of the Ing final. Yoda started badly, with a half-point loss in the first game, but he bounced back with two 1½-point wins to achieve his most cherished ambition: victory in a world championship. These three games are presented below with brief commentaries.

1st Samsung Cup final Game One

White: Yoda Norimoto (Japan)

Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)

Played in Seoul on November 25, 1996.

Figure 1 (1–60)

The result to 38 is promising for White. It is painful for Black to have to live with 43 in response to the successive moves of 40 and 42. By 50, White has the lead.

Figure 2 (61–120)

In this figure, Yoo plays tenaciously and makes the game very close.

Figure 3 (121–196)

White 32 is the losing move: the exchange for 33 loses points. If White had simply played White 34 through 38, he would have stayed ahead.

This upset, following on Yoda's succes-

sive losses to Yoo in the Ing final, did not augur well for his prospects.

Black wins by ½ point.




Figure 1 (1-60)




Figure 2 (61-120)

During October and November, Yoda spent a total of 28 days on the road playing international tournament games in China and Korea. In order to approach the Samsung final in a completely fresh spirit after his Ing setback, he decided to wear traditional Japanese dress (haori and hakama), perhaps the first time a player has done this in an international tournament —

and one not even played in Japan. Apparently, his outfit went over well with the Korean media, however.




Figure 3 (121-196)
93: connects (at 32)

Game Two

White: Yoo Chang-hyuk

Black: Yoda Norimoto

Played in Seoul on November 27, 1996.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

The result from 37 to 43 makes the game a little easier for Black.




Figure 2 (51-100)
80: ko (below 51); 85: ko (at 51)
ko: 88, 91, 94, 97, 100

Figure 2 (51-100)

When Black sacrifices the right side and caps at 81, he has the lead.




Figure 3 (101-155)
6: ko; 34: connects (below 32); 45: ko

Figure 3 (101-155)

Black 45 is a major blunder, played under the pressure of byo-yomi. If instead Black had extended two spaces from 39 (= 57 in Figure 4), the game would have been won.

White seizes his chance to attack at 46, a

carefully thought-out do-or-die move.

Black 47 is another mistake: Black could have just barely survived the attack if he had played at 52.

Black 47 lets White split him into two with 50, so his lead is upset. There is no way Black can win.

White 48. Now it is Yoo's turn to succumb to the pressure of an international match. If instead White had played White 49-Black A-White 48-Black B, then the descent at 64 in Figure 4 would have become absolute sente against the corner group; if White then made the same cut with 50-54 with that sente move up his sleeve, the black group here would not have been able to save itself.




Figure 4 (156-200)

Figure 4 (156-200)

White 60 should be at 64.

White 98 should be at 99: White can win the ko above, so that would make a difference of a point.

Figure 5 (201-260)

White's failure to exchange White 27 for Black A let Black take the reverse-sente three-point move of 27, which made the game a definite win for Black. White missed repeated chances of securing a win in the endgame.

Black wins by 1½ points.




Figure 5 (201-260)
White wins and connects the ko (at 60).

Game Three

White: Yoda Norimoto
Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk
Played in Seoul on November 29.




Figure 1 (1-63)
53: ko

Figure 1 (1-63)

The opening of this game was played very fast, which is not surprising, considering that both players had plenty of experience with it. The moves to 35 were the same

as in Game Three of the Ing final, and up to 25 they were the same as in Game One of this match.

The game goes off on a new path when Yoda plays just one stone at the top with 38, then switches to 40. Apparently, this is a strategy that occurred to him while playing the Ing Cup game.

White takes adequate compensation for the ko with 54 and 56. When he plays his third successive move in this corner with 62, he is planning to sacrifice his centre top group.





Figure 2 (64-134)
73: connects (above 71)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (64-134)

White puts his sacrifice strategy into effect with 64 to 78. Transforming the left side into a moyo secures the lead for White.

White 100. Yoda jumped to the conclusion that Black would atari at A, letting White play B, but Yoo surprised him by switching to 101. On reflection, Yoda concluded that the simplest move for 100 would

have been 1 in *Dia. 1*.

Dia. 1 (previous page). If White 1, Black will later play 2 and 4. Black 2 at 'a' would not work: White counters with White 3, Black 'b', White 'c', Black 5, White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.

However, even though Black takes corner profit in the game, there is a redeeming factor for White: the cut he makes at 108 before living with 110. The ladder favours White, so Black has no choice but to pull back with 109. As before, White has the lead.

White 128 is an overplay. If instead White had secured the capture of the four black stones with White C, he would have had a big lead. With 129 on, Yoo shows his true worth. However, White keeps sente and maintains his lead by switching to 134, the largest point on the board.





Figure 3 (135-200)

Figure 3 (135-200)

White 42 and 44 in response to Black's peep are very slack moves. When Black invades at 45, White's lead has been upset, according to Yoda. Even if White ignores 41, Black A would be unreasonable: White B, Black C, White 44, Black D, White E, and White captures two black stones. Consequently, White should have played 42 at 62, which would have been a declaration of victory.

The endgame is very difficult. Lee Chang-ho commented that the game was a

half-pointer. We do not know what made the margin $1\frac{1}{2}$ points — further research is needed.



in Korea.

Needless to say, the *Go Weekly* reporter was not happy with the epithet for Japan and was greatly relieved when Yoda won the match.

(*Go Weekly*, 16 December, 1996)

More news on the Korean go scene: 8th Tong Yang Securities Cup gets under way

In its December 9 issue, *Go Weekly* had a report on the preliminary qualifying rounds of the 8th Tong Yang Securities Cup, the first of the Korean international tournaments.

The *Go Weekly* article was mainly devoted to a report on Kobayashi Koichi's success in winning his way into the main tournament (it seems to have adopted the same international preliminary system as the Samsung Cup). He was joined by Kato Masao from Japan, Seo Bong-soo from Korea, and Chang Hao 7-dan and Wang 6-dan of China.

Kobayashi has vowed to do his best in international tournaments. He is quoted as saying: 'We can't just keep on losing. Excuses about [differences in national] conditions and environments aren't good enough. Japan has to make more serious efforts in international tournaments.'

Surprisingly, this was actually the first time Kobayashi had ever played in the Tong Yang Securities Cup. Being titleless now, he at least has the time to make good on his pledge.

Kobayashi: 'Previously I'd been to Korea only twice, but just this year I've made six trips there.'

In the second game of the qualifying tournament, Kobayashi played a 19-year-old 2-dan named Kim (we don't know how to read his given name, but we are sure the go world will be hearing more of him in due course). His low rank doesn't mean that Kim is weak: he beat five other Koreans to get into the the qualifying tournament and in the first round there he beat Yu Bin 9-dan, one of China's top five players.

If you put aside Lee Chang-ho and the rest of the top group in Korea, it's said that the lower a player's dan is, the stronger he

is. That may sound paradoxical, but it's a result of the unprecedented go boom generated by the success of Lee Chang-ho. So many young people are trying to become professional go players that the annual qualifying tournament has become extremely competitive and only very strong players make it. One top Japanese professional commented that there was a difference of about one stone in strength between the new professionals in Japan and those in Korea. The competition is so tough, apparently, that it's out of the question for a player to make professional shodan at the tender age of 14 or 15, as is common in Japan.

Kobayashi: '[Cho] Hun-hyun was saying that there are about 20 young players like Kim aiming at the top. He said that even he can't explain why the young players are so strong.'

'However, I have a feeling I know the reason. The amount of study they do is different from the young Japanese players. Even when there are no official games, they're at the Korean Ki-in every day studying.'

The *Go Weekly* reporter put the question to Kobayashi: Is Japanese go going to be eclipsed by this explosion of talent in Korea?

Kobayashi: 'Lee Chang-ho is certainly strong. But the idea that a whole crowd of Lee Chang-hos is going to emerge is ridiculous, I think. It's going to be no easy task for those 20 promising young players to reach the level of Lee.'

The article concluded with the reassuring thought that Kobayashi is one of the few players who has won a majority of his games with Lee (as far as we know, the other Japanese player to have done so is Yoda).

The Japanese players will have the chance to show that they still have what it takes soon enough: the main tournament of the Tong Yang Securities Cup starts on 7 January 1997.

•Rob van Zeijst followed up on his landmark win against a Korean 6-dan professional in the Samsung Cup. This time he beat Yu Kong-jae 7-dan of Korea in the first round, but lost to Wang 6-dan of China in the second.

(*Go Weekly*, 9 Dec. 1996. Report by John Power.)

The 9th Fujitsu Cup

The Final: Lee vs. Ma

White: Ma Xiaochun (China)

Black: Lee Chang-ho (Korea)

Commentary by Yoda Norimoto and Ryu Shikun




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 1 (1-15). *White's opening is questioned.*

Ryu: Lee doesn't impress you as being a terribly strong opponent, but he keeps winning all the same. That's what's strongest about him.

Yoda: It's what he sees — moves that ordinary players wouldn't notice.

Ryu: He counts accurately, and always stays calm.

Yoda: It's not easy to play your normal game in all situations. When there's a crucial match you absolutely have to win, the pressure can do unbelievable things to your play, as I can tell you.

Ryu: Lee studies incredibly, too. He goes over all the Korean tournament games, even down to the shodan level. He's already worried about younger players overtaking him.

Yoda: In this game, since Black played down at 11, I think White had to play 12 at 15. I wonder why he didn't.

Figure 2 (16-28). *Strange moves*

Ryu: I would have preferred to play Black 23 at 27 immediately.




Figure 2 (16-28)

Yoda: The whole sequence from Black 23 to White 28 was strange. I don't really understand it. Especially Black 27 — Black should play A.

Ryu: Black 27 is a Lee Chang-ho specialty, but it was odd to allow White 28.

Yoda: Shouldn't White have played 28 at A?

Ryu: Ma goes for territory.





Figure 3 (29-59)

Figure 3 (29-59). *Illogic?*

Yoda: Wasn't there something illogical

about Black 29 and 31, adding territory to a group that was already strong? Black probably lost a lot by exchanging those moves for White 30 and 32. But White shouldn't have capped at 38. He should have jumped to 50, followed perhaps by Black C and White 41. Anyway, what happens if White plays 40 at 41?

Ryu: After Black 2 to 6 in *Dia. 1*, White has to play 7.



Dia. 1

Yoda: And Black plays 8, so maybe White isn't accomplishing much.

Ryu: It hurt to have Black capture a stone with 47 and 49. There's still White A—Black B left, but it's hard for White to start that ko, because the damage if he loses it is too big.

Yoda: I was impressed by Black 51. Much more definite than Black C. The result through 59 put Black in the lead.

Ryu: But Ma didn't seem to think he was behind. I was watching this game on the TV monitor in the pressroom. Ma was playing quickly and confidently around here.




Figure 4 (60-79)

Figure 4 (60-79). Lee defends

Yoda: Black 73 to 75 were a calm and collected answer to White's invasion at 72.

Ryu: This was pure Lee Changho. No one else would play like that. Black 73 and 75 are the moves you use when your corner is surrounded. I would have played Black 75 on the point between 76 and 77.





Figure 5 (80-101)

85, 88, 91, 94, 97: take ko around 82

Figure 5 (80-101). The ko begins.

Yoda: White is in a weak ko position, so it was funny of him to start the ko at 80.

Ryu: White 92 was a bad ko threat. This was a place where White could normally play A in sente.



Dia. 2

Yoda: If White had played 1 to 7 in *Dia. 2*, instead of White 80, Black might still have been slightly ahead, but the game would have been more difficult.

Ryu: Black won't like having to live on the left side. If he descends at 80, White can play B in sente.





Figure 6 (102-125)

Figure 6 (102-125). *The unexpected connection*

Ryu: Ma was trying to make Lee connect at Black 7. Just when everyone watching was saying 'he'll never connect there,' that's what he did.

Yoda: No one else would connect immediately like that.



Dia. 3

Ryu: I think White 18 was the losing move. If White had played 1 in *Dia. 3*, the game would have been far from over, even though Black will obviously play 2.

Yoda: Black gets to make the capping attack at 8, so he may be a little ahead, but it's still difficult.

Ryu: White 18 was worth nearly ten points in reverse sente, but White couldn't afford to allow those two black pushes at 21 and 23.




Figure 7 (126-165)

Figure 7 (126-165). *An easy finish*

Ryu: After capping at 27, Black just coasted the rest of the way. He answered all of White's moves, linking everything together with Black 33 to 45.

Yoda: When he played Black 43, White's center group was beyond help.

Ryu: There were some moves in this game that would have been criticized if they had been made by a weaker player, but since they were played by Lee Chang-ho, you wonder if there may have been something in them.

White resigns after Black 165.

(Kido, October 1996. Translated by James Davies.)

The 21st Meijin Title Match Takemiya Masaki vs. Cho Chikun



The ever-ebullient Takemiya (left) has even his opponent Cho laughing at the party in Hong Kong the evening before the first game.

Cho captures the top three titles

Cho Chikun has done it again. By winning the Meijin title from Takemiya Masaki by four wins to two losses, for the second time in his career Cho simultaneously holds the top three Japanese titles, the Kisei, Meijin and Honinbo. Thirteen years ago he also held these three titles (from March 18, 1983, when he took the Kisei title, until he lost the Honinbo title on July 28 the same year).

The title match was a sharp clash of two opposing styles. Takemiya is famous for his cosmic style, which emphasizes outside influence. Cho, in sharp contrast, first goes for territory, then invades his opponent's moyo, utilizing his renowned ability at *shinogi* (securing life for a group under attack).

Ironically, in the first game it was Takemiya who found one of his groups under attack within a Cho stronghold. He made a slip with move 38 and, when it became obvious that his group could not live, Takemiya

resigned after only 61 moves, the shortest game ever in a best-of-seven match.

In the second game, however, Takemiya exacted his revenge. After Takemiya built a huge moyo, Cho had to invade, but Takemiya went all-out to kill the invading stones. Finding it impossible to get two eyes for his group at the bottom, Cho switched to the right side, but again Takemiya defended brilliantly. Cho ended up with two dead groups and had to resign after 101 moves.

The fourth and sixth games followed the same pattern: Takemiya built a moyo and Cho invaded. But in contrast to the second game, Cho lived up to his reputation as the master of *shinogi* and made life for his endangered groups. Only in the fifth game did Cho make an uncharacteristic slip: he neglected to make a necessary move in a group that should have lived and suddenly it was without two eyes.

In this issue, we present the first four games. The remaining two games will be given in the next issue.

Game One

White: Takemiya Masaki Meijin

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei and Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played in Hong Kong on September 6-7, 1996.




Figure 1 (1-17)

Figure 1 (1-17). Takemiya's strange move

Black 7 and White 8 are currently fashionable moves, but White 10 was unusual. Takemiya probably wanted to take Cho by surprise. Kobayashi Satoru, who gave the TV commentary for this game, commented that it was the first time he had ever seen it. He felt that Takemiya's fighting spirit displayed itself in this move. But the pros in the pressroom didn't think highly of it. The expected sequence was White 10 at A, followed by Black 11-White B-Black 10-White C-Black D-White E. This was what Cho had expected, but he made no criticism and even ventured the opinion that White 10 was feasible. In any case, after the exchange of White 12-Black 13, White was clearly falling behind.

Figure 2 (18-31). Cho's surprising moves

White 18 was the logical move in this position, but Black 19 was a surprise. Everyone expected Cho to attach at 1 in *Dia. 1* and jump to 3. However, Cho didn't like the prospect of White jumping to 4, which he thought would be a very good move.






Figure 2 (18-31)




Dia. 1

Cho wasn't bothered by White sliding to A because after the sequence to Black 8 in *Dia. 2*, the white stones on the right side are in great danger. For that reason Takemiya played the checking extension of White 20. Moreover, White wants to avoid a fight along the right side because it might spill over into the potentially large territory White has staked out at the bottom.

Black next invaded at 21. Against the attachment of 22, Black was able to wedge in at 23 because the ladder was in his favor. That is, if White ataris at 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black ataris with 4 and 6, then captures a stone in a ladder with 8, staking out territory in the upper right.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Defending tightly with White 28 is the best move. If Black cuts at B with 29, the squeeze to White 12 in *Dia. 4* is one of many ways White can counter.



Dia. 4

However, after Black secures his stones with 29, Black aims at the peep of C, followed by D, and the black stones are heavy and will come under a severe attack. For that reason, White played 30 to make good shape.

Black 31 was the last move played on the first day. It attacks the eye space of the white group.





Figure 3 (32-61)

Figure 3 (32-61). The losing move

White 32 was the sealed move. All the professional watching the game in the press-room agreed that this was the best move. Simply jumping to 33 would have been safe, but it lacked any strong impact.




Dia. 5

Against Black 33 and 35, White 34 and 36 were the strongest responses. Cho was very surprised at the power of Takemiya's moves and he felt that he had attacked too strongly. But after Black 37, Takemiya quickly played White 38, with barely any thought. It was a big mistake: the losing move. He should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 5* instead. Then, after the sequence to Black 4, White would attach at 5. This was the sequence that Cho was most afraid of. Instead of Black 2, Cho could have

played at 3, but then the sequence White 'a'–Black 2–White 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'd' would follow and Black would have lost two stones.

Takemiya: 'I overlooked this simple attachment. In both cases, it would have resulted in an exchange (*furikawari*), but the exchange in *Dia. 5* is clearly much better for White than in the game.'

Black 49 was the knockout punch. The remaining moves were just played to set the scene for resignation. After 61, if White connected at 1 in *Dia. 6*, a complicated capturing race would have resulted, but Black would have won this race by one move. Clearly, Takemiya didn't want to leave behind a game record that would have been unworthy of a Meijin, so he honorably resigned.



Dia. 6

White resigns after Black 61.

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun Kisei and Honinbo


Black: Takemiya Masaki Meijin

Played on September 18–19, 1996

Figure 1 (1–31). Unexpected moves

Takemiya played his favorite opening, the *sanren-sei*.

In response to White 6, Black played the diagonal move of 7 after only one minute of thought.



Dia. 1

Black 11 was an important move. If you compare the result in the figure with *Dia. 1*, the difference is immediately clear. In *Dia. 1*, the side is open at A, but in the game Black was able to completely confine White to the corner with 13 and 15.





Figure 1 (1–31)

It might seem strange that Black did not connect below 17, but such a move is unnecessary. Of course, White could cut with 1 in *Dia. 2*, but this would gain him only a few points and Black would make a thick position on the outside with 2 and 4.



Dia. 2

Black 19 was an unorthodox move. Black 19 at 27 would be the more conventional move, since it would work better if White were to invade at A.

Instead of 21, one would expect Takemiya to play on the star point at B.

Cho also played an unexpected move. Instead of the checking extension on the wider side at C, which is the commonsense move, Cho played on the narrow side at White 22.

However, the high extension at Black 23 is a move one would expect of Takemiya — it is consistent with his moyo strategy.





Figure 2 (32-59)

Figure 2 (32-59). A box-shaped moyo

After the game, Takemiya said that Black D might have been a bit better than 25. In any case, all the corners are settled and Takemiya is competing against three corners with only one of his own.

The highlight of this game was Black 33. This was a brilliant move, and Cho became quite perplexed when he saw it. White 32 was also a good move, but it did not reduce the effectiveness of Black 33.

White should have played 34 one more line to the right.



Dia. 3


White 39 was a severe move. In answer to 37, White could have made good shape by extending to 1 in *Dia. 3*, but then Black could play 2, and after 4 Black's moyo on the right would be huge.

White 42 was indispensable because if Black were to hane at 42, he could then push through and cut into the upper side.

Black 43 again blocks White's progress into the center and completes a box-shaped moyo.


Cho stakes the game on his invasion with Black 44.

Takemiya thought for one hour and seven minutes on Black 47. With this move he decided to go all out and kill the white stones at the bottom. If he jumped to 1 as in *Dia. 4*, White could have lived at the bottom with the sequence to 10. (If Black A, White would play B, followed by C.) This is not necessarily bad for Black, but the game would be decided in the endgame.



Dia. 4

Once Black played 57, there was no way for the black group at the bottom to live on its own. For example, if White makes a bamboo joint with 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black would play the diagonal move of 2.



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (60–101). *Two white groups die.*

For this reason, Cho switched to the right side with 60, hoping to use the aji of his group at the bottom to form a living group somewhere inside Black's moyo.




Figure 3 (60–101)


Because Takemiya was able to read out the variation in *Dia. 6*, he was able to confidently play 77. That is, instead of 78, if White had played 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black would sacrifice four stones at the top and link up his stones on the right with Black 10 to 14.

According to Hane 9-dan, Black 77 was the move that won the game.

Cho struggled on, but he was probably just

trying to find the right time to resign.

White resigns after Black 101.



Dia. 6

Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki Meijin

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo

Played on October 2–3, 1996.

Figure 1 (1–44). *Bad moves by the Meijin*

The two diagonal moves of White 12 and 14 were bad. These are moves that one does not expect from a player of Takemiya's caliber. Instead of 12, jumping to White 1 in *Dia. 1* would be the natural move and consistent with Takemiya's style of play.



Cho and Hane discussing what went wrong in the second game, while Takemiya stares at the two groups of Cho's he has killed.





Figure 1 (1-44)




Dia. 1


White 32 is certainly the vital point of this position, but Takemiya usually plays more nimble moves than this.

With 36, White aims to launch a large-scale attack on the four thin black stones above. However, to follow this up with the forcing moves of 38 and 40 just helps Black strengthen his stones in the lower left. If the two marked stones in *Dia. 2* had been exchanged, then White 1 and 3 could be justified because an attack on the black group below would no longer be possible.

The peep at 42 was too slow. According to Ishida Yoshio, after going to the trouble of strengthening his stones on the lower left side, Takemiya should have severely attacked with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black 43, making good shape in the center, punishes White for his move at 42. White 44 ensures about 50 points of territory on the left side, but this is all White has. Black's stones dominate the rest of the board.



Dia. 4

19: connects at 8





Figure 2 (45-60)

Figure 2 (45-60). The losing move

After White 44, Black took sente and invaded on the right with 45. However, White 46 and 48 next were called the losing moves: they helped Black solidify his territory in the upper right. After the sequence to 60, White's group on the right side is still insecure and without eyes.


Instead of 46, Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan suggested that White might play at 1 in *Dia. 4* (previous page). One possible variation examined in the pressroom was the squeeze to Black 20. This would not be good for White.



Dia. 5 16: connects at 5


Ishida Yoshio gave the variation in *Dia. 5*, starting with the diagonal move of 1 instead of White 13 in *Dia. 4*. This would result in a difficult fight after the sequence to 16, and it

is difficult to determine which side would come out better. For sure, the cause of all White's problems here was his dubious move at the marked stone.



Dia. 6

Otake suggested turning at White 1 in *Dia. 6* instead of 13 in *Dia. 4*. Black squeezes with 6 and 8, but after 9 the cutting points at 'a' and 'b' are left behind, so this is a little better for White.



Dia. 7

Instead of White 46, the diagonal move of White 1 in *Dia. 7* is also possible, but Black is more than satisfied to secure territory at the top and at the bottom with the sequence to 6. According to Abe 9-dan, if Black 2 at 'a', White will force at 2, then link up his stones with 'b'. This is an acceptable shape for White, but Black would not be unhappy with this result.





Figure 3 (61-100)

Figure 3 (61-100). The meaning of the peep

The peep of White 62 certainly profits Black, but White had to play it. If he didn't, Black could peep at 1 in *Dia. 8*. If White connects at 'a', Black would play at 'b', and White would be under a severe attack. Therefore, White would only be able to defend at 2. After 7, White cannot exchange 'c' for 'd' because Black will connect at 'e' instead of 'd'. The timing of White 62 was important.



Dia. 8

Dia. 9

Kobayashi Satoru suggest the sequence in *Dia. 9*. This avoids the crude peep in *Dia. 8*.

Figure 4 (101-124). Strong moves by both sides

White 18 was the correct response to 17. If White connects at 2 in *Dia. 10*, Black plays the sequence to 5. Now White can't fight back by

playing at 'a'. Otherwise, against Black 5, White can counterattack at 'b' and a fierce fight would result. In any case, this wasn't played and was left as aji.






Figure 4 (101-124)




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Black ignored the peep of White 20 and captured at 21. A weaker player would have

been frightened and connected, but 21 was the strongest response. Still, connecting at 1 in *Dia. 11*, would have been a safe way to play, but Cho always goes all-out, looking for the best move.



Dia. 12

Instead of 24, White 1 in *Dia. 12* would have result in an exchange up to Black 4. This would have been advantageous for Black.




Figure 5 (124-196)

Figure 5 (124-196). *The game is over.*

After Black 25, the professionals in the pressroom decided that Takemiya's position was hopeless and stopped analyzing the game.

Black wins by 11 1/2 points.


Game Four

White: Cho Chikun Kisei and Honinbo

Black: Takemiya Masaki Meijin

Played on October 9-10, 1996

Just as in the second game Takemiya played the *sanren-sei* opening and the game followed the same pattern: Black built a huge moyo and White invaded. However, unlike before, Cho's invading stones survived. The moment of truth arrived when White played 1 in the figure below (White 62), fighting to get two eyes for his encircled group. Takemiya pondered his response for one hour and 56 minutes, but there was no way that White's stones were going to die.



Game Four highlight




Figure 1 (1-27)

Figure 1 (1–27). *Black makes a huge moyo.*

The first seven moves of this game were the same as in the second game, but with White 8 Cho played an approach move at the bottom, instead of invading at 12.

After Black 11, invading at White 12 is mandatory.

Takemiya played the sequence to Black 15 quickly, but he thought about Black 17 for a long time.

Black 17 at A would have been the proper move, but then Black would have made two moves more than White in the upper right; this is not Takemiya's style. Moreover, Black would have no effective move against the white group. Neither Black B nor the Black C–White D exchange is a serious threat to White. Therefore, Takemiya switched to the bottom with Black 17 and played the same pattern as he did at the top.

White might have simply descended to 26 with 22. Either way, Black would have still played somewhere around 27, but by playing the sequence from 22 to 26, White put emphasis on the cut at E.

Despite the weak points in his position, Takemiya played on the central point with Black 27, staking out a huge moyo.




Figure 2 (28–45)

Figure 2 (28–45). *Black's weak points*

White cuts at Black's weak point with 28, then caps at 30, challenging Black's moyo strategy.

After Black 31 and 33, it would be a bit hard for White to get a good result by imme-

diately running away with the two white stones. At this point White doesn't know which would be better, pushing through at A or attaching at B. Therefore, he leaves the situation as it is and switches to the top, cutting through with 34 and 36.

Instead of jumping to C, the atari of Black 27 was a brave decision. Black cedes the territory at the top to White, but maps out a huge territory below, just like in the second game.

Takemiya spent no time thinking about his moves up to 43. However, Black 43 was a bit slack. After the game, Takemiya said that he should have followed the sequence Black D–White E–Black F–White G, then jumped to Black H. After that it would have been hard for White to live on the right side.

White 44 is the first move that comes to mind in this position. The slackness of Black 43 made this move viable.

Black 45 was the last move played on the first day.





Figure 3 (46–62)

Figure 3 (46–62). *A difficult problem*

The cut of White 46, the sealed move, was expected, but White 48 was a subtle move. Black 49 prevents the two white stones below from moving out into the center.

The attachment of White 50 must have distressed Takemiya. He thought for one hour and 14 minutes before playing Black 51. Takemiya said that this was the best move, but if that were the case, instead of playing 55 against White 54, he should have captured at 1 in *Dia. 1*, then continued the fight by letting

White break out into the bottom with the sequence to 15.



Dia. 1

However, Black is determined to confine the fight to the right side by blocking with 55. Now, after White 62, Black is faced with the difficult problem of killing the white stones. The professionals in the pressroom all agreed that White could live by playing at A.





Figure 4 (63-100)
88: connects at 85

Figure 4 (63-100). *Black's strategy collapses.*

Takemiya thought for one hour and 56 minutes before playing Black 63. He had to capture the white stones or his moyo strategy would collapse. However, at this point White was alive.

The sequence that was worked out by the professionals in the pressroom is shown in *Dia. 2*. White lives with the placement at 1. Black attaches at 2, but White gets an eye with 3. Next, White 9 is a tesuji. Against Black 10, White sacrifices two stones with 11, then gets his second eye with the sequence to 17. In the game, White was able to live from 66 on, but after the game, when Cho saw *Dia. 2*, he agreed that this was the best way to play.



Dia. 2

With 74 and 76, White is clearly alive and White 80 decided the game.

With 85, Black's fighting spirit returns and he pulls off an exchange by capturing the white stones in the lower right corner, but White is still in the lead.




Figure 5 (101-140)
13: takes ko at 1; 15: connects at 4

Figure 5 (101–140). *Desperation*


Takemiya is lost, but he tries to stir things up on the left side with the invasion of 1. When Black ataried with 9, Cho stopped to think. He hane'd at 10, then ataried at 12. Black ignored the ko threat of 14 and the white stones in the lower right corner came back to life when White captured two stones with 16. However, the safe way of playing would have been to connect at 1 in *Dia. 3*, then defend the corner territory with 3.

With Black 1 to 23 and from 25 on, Takemiya invades the two corners on the left, but when White settles his groups on the left with 38 and 40, Black is hopelessly behind.

Black resigns after White 140.

From *Kido*, November and December 1996.

Translated by Richard Bozulich.



Dia. 3



Cho Chikun

*On his way to becoming a
three-crown champion again*

The 51st Honinbo Title Match

Continued from page 50

I mentioned at the beginning that Ryu plays a wise game, and now that this series is over I think so even more. Ryu is said to be trying to play a 'big game'. He may not have this perfected yet, but I definitely felt the broadness of his go. The slight fragility is only natural, because he's still young. Experience will take care of that in due time. For myself,

now that I've come this far, I'm aiming for ten straight Honinbo titles. Perhaps the fans and the Mainichi Newspaper Company will get tired of the same old Cho Chikun every year, but ten straight might have some praiseworthy novelty value, or so I let myself think.

White wins by 4 1/2 points.

(From *Kido*, September, 1996. Translated by James Davies.

The 51st Honinbo Title Match

In our last issue, we presented commentaries on the first two games of the 1996 Honinbo title match. In this issue, we continue our coverage with commentaries on games three to six. Cho is leading 2-0.

Game Three

White: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on June 10-11, 1996.

Commentary from Kido (August 1996)





Figure 1 (1-28)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-28). Twenty-one moves the first day Cho spent over an hour on Black 15 and

over two hours on Black 21, which was the last move of the first day. The general opinion was that he should have played Black 21 at A or B.

Dia. 1 shows Black A. Cho must have devoted much thought to the complex variations following Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' before abandoning this diagram.






Figure 2 (29-56)

Figure 2 (29-56). Black seems to be struggling.

Cho always goes for the maximum, so he often seems to be in trouble. It would have been safer to play Black 31 at 1 in Dia. 2, half shutting White in, since White 'a' can be answered at Black 'b'.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

It would also have been safer to play Black 33 at 34. White 34 was severe. White could have started by cutting at 1 in *Dia. 3*, then made a strong shape with 3 and 5, but as the game actually developed, Black was split into three groups, and the one in the middle got captured. Ryu must have felt confident that he was now in the lead. Still, Black had taken profit with 31, 53, and 55, and had taken the 3-3 point in the top left corner, so he was not doing as badly as it looked.




Figure 3 (56-100)


Figure 3 (56-100). A question of judgment

Ryu said he should have played White 56 at 57, to avoid the problems caused by Black 57 and 59. White 57 may have been correct. In the actual game, Black captured two stones in the center and cut at 79, and White had to be careful.


Cho's opinion was that White should have played 66 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, an easy move to overlook. The players agreed that White 3 and 5 would give White the lead, but that is not really clear. Black 4 makes a huge capture in the top left. In the bottom left Black cannot escape easily, but he can play Black 'a' to White 'f' in sente, then force at Black 'g'. In the center, Black can connect at 'h' in sente, so it may be difficult for White to get much territory there.

When White played 94, Black could have answered at 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White plays 2, Black 3 is big, and Black can play 'a', threatening 'b'. Black could have played 'a' even earlier. In the game, White got there first, at 96. Cho must

have felt that he was not doing badly when he played 79 and the rest, but Ryu took a different view of the game; he continued to think he was ahead. He was surprised when he saw an article in the sponsoring newspaper the next day, which credited him with having come from 'far behind' to win. 'I was only behind for one short moment,' he protested. This complacency may have been brought on by the capture of the six black stones in *Figure 2*, but that capture was not really cause for optimism. You could not in all fairness say that Black was behind at that point. Ryu may have won the game, but his judgment of the lead was not necessarily accurate.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (101-129). Climax

Black 19 was devastating. White had to answer Black 23 with 24 and 26 to prevent

Black A, but that let Black play 27, relieving the threat of White B, followed by White 25. This was the 'short moment' when Ryu realized he was behind. At the next instant, Black lost the game by playing 29. If he had defended at C, followed by White 29 and Black D, the game would have been close, but Black would have won.




Figure 4 (101-129)

Figure 5 (130-178). Anticlimax

According to Cho himself, he had overlooked something 'too embarrassing to admit' in the capturing race following Black 33. White had an eye, Black didn't, and White was a move ahead.

Black resigns after White 178.




Figure 5 (130-178)

35: connects against 34; 40: connects above 36

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Commentary by Kato Masao





Figure 1 (1-23)

Figure 1 (1-23). Cho vs. Cho

The opening through Black 13 duplicated an opening Cho had tried against O Rissei in the 1994 Acom Cup final. Cho had taken Black in that game, so in effect, Ryu was forcing Cho to play against himself. Among Black's moves, 9 is unusual. This is a severe pincer, but for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. White 14 brings Black 9 under strong attack.



Dia. 1

After Black 23, Cho settled down to think. The obvious move is White 1 in Dia. 1, but if White plays there immediately, Black will exchange 2 for 3, then press at 4, and after White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black can connect at 'd'. Cho pondered for over an hour here, and, judging by what happened afterward, the time was well spent.





Figure 2 (24-43)

Figure 2 (24-43). End of the first day's play

Black followed the proverb and captured the cutting stone with 27. Black 27 at A would give White a forcing move at B. (If White had cut with 26 at A, however, Black would have replied with C.) Losing a liberty at 24 and a stone at 26 were disadvantages for White, but he now had the cuts at A and D to aim at. Cho thought for another 37 minutes after Black 31, then surprised Ryu by capturing a stone with White 32 and 34. These moves look amateurish, because of Black 37, but they turned out well. Black should perhaps have omitted the 35-36 exchange. Black 43 aimed at Black E, but Black was not likely to get a chance to make this attachment. He should probably have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* to move into the center faster.



Dia. 2

Figure 3 (44-63). White opens up a lead.

White 44, the sealed move that ended the first day, was well timed. Before deciding whether to pursue the center with a move

around 48 or a move around 49, White forces Black to commit himself to a reply to 44. Black does not want to reply at A or B, because that would leave White with further forcing moves in the center, but he has to make some reply, or else White 1 to 9 in *Dia. 3* are destructive.






Figure 3 (44-63)



Dia. 3

Black 45 prevented *Dia. 3*, but made White 48 doubly effective. If White had played 48 first, Black would not have answered 44 at 45. White can play C in sente, so he answers 51 at 52. Black 53 was an outright mistake. Black had no good reply to White 54. He had to reinforce his position with 55, but this strengthened White in the center, leaving Black with no good use for the stone at 51.



Dia. 4

Black should have played 53 at 1 in *Dia. 4*. After Black 3, White needs to defend at 4, so Black can play 5, preventing White 'a'. This result might be slightly favorable to White, but White would still be far from having the game won. Black 57 was another mistake. Black should have played at 58, to create more defects in White shape.





Figure 4 (62-100)


Figure 4 (62-100). *White stays out in front.*

After his mistakes in the last figure, Ryu seemed to lose the will to win. He played all of the moves from Black 63 to 83 in less than a minute each. White 64 kept White's lead safe. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black can set up a ko with 2 to 6. Black will welcome a ko

fight, especially in view of White's cutting points.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

In the bottom right corner, both players were maneuvering for sente. That was why White cut at 78 instead of at 1 in *Dia. 6*. In *Dia. 6*, Black can ignore White 3 and switch to 4, and White's lead is reduced. In the game, White got sente to play 84. Black 85 was stubborn, but White 86 was a clever reply, anticipating Black 87. White 88 chased Black out at 89 and 91, and these two moves had no effect on the strong white position to the left. White could have played 96 at A and won easily, but he cross-cut with 96 and 98, fighting all the way in typical Cho style. White 96 and 98 are more resourceful than White A.





Figure 5 (101-140)

30, 33: ko around 27; 35: connects above 27

Figure 5 (101–140). *Into the home stretch*

Cho was beginning to run short of time, and he had several weak groups on the board, but he had his defences prepared. He was never in danger. Ryu thought for 41 minutes about Black 9. During this time he must have searched for some chance to win, found none, reflected on his play, and prepared himself for defeat. One of the hardest things for a player to do is to convince himself that he has lost. Black could have played 19 at A, but to no particular avail. Nor would it have done any good to play 23 at A; Black captures a stone, but White's main group lives. Black 37 gave White an easy life in the center. What if Black had attacked with 1 in *Dia. 7*? Following Black 3, White can still live with 4 to 10, but Black picks up points with 11, 13, and 15. Unfortunately, Black loses the game anyway, due to the komi, so this sequence is only marginally better than what actually happened.



Dia. 7

Figure 6 (141–190). *An outstanding game by White*

White was slightly ahead even without the komi when Black resigned. Although Black made a fatal mistake at 53 in Figure 3, that does not detract from White's superb play throughout the game. Black 9 in Figure 1 may have been the losing move.

Black resigns after White 190.
(Abridged from *Kido*, August 1996)




Figure 6 (141–190)

Game Five

White: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Commentary abridged from Kido (August 1996)




Figure 1 (1–26)
24: takes ko (at 18)

Figure 1 (1–26). *Another early fight*

After early fighting in the previous games, this one seemed to be developing peacefully through Black 11. The truce was broken, however, by Ryu's unconventional moves at White 12 and 14 and Cho's stubborn counters at Black 15 to 25. Black 25 signaled an intention to fight the ko. White dodged sideways to 26.





Figure 2 (27-60)
34, 39, 42: take ko (around 31);
48: connects (at 31)

Figure 2 (27-60). Ryu finds a saving move.

White 36 caught Cho off guard. If Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White can play 2 and win the ko. After White 10, Black's group to the left lacks eye shape, and White can still live in ko with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' in the top right corner, because White 'd' is sente. Cho thought for over an hour and a half, then replied at Black 37.




Dia. 1
6: takes ko (above 3)


White 50 was the sealed move that ended the first day. If White captures at A, Black has an obvious eye-stealing attack at B. The overall result of the first day's fight was slightly in Black's favor, since even after 50, White is not definitely alive, but it would have been much worse for White if he had not found the saving move at 36.

Black could have played 51 at 54 or C to take the top right corner, worth at least twenty points. Cho said he did not want to let White

play D, but Ryu said he was more worried about having the upper right corner captured. After White 54, the status of that corner is a little complex. If Black attacks with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, White can live unconditionally with 4 to 8. Black 1 in *Dia. 3* produces a ko, however, so White is still not secure.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Cho played 55 and 57 to gain safety for his group at the top, but he commented afterward that this group was already safe, because Black E was sente against the top right corner, so he should have played 55 at 58. Regardless of this, Ryu thought he was still a little behind after White 60.






Figure 3 (61-117)

Figure 3 (61–117). *Ryu takes the lead.*

Ryu made his bid for the lead by invading at White 64. If Black replies at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White will play 2 and 4. The result is quite bad for Black, since White 12 breaks up the right side. It also looks bad for Black to play 69 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, since the marked white stone retains some nuisance potential. The sequence through Black 79 may have been inevitable.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Ryu decided against starting a major ko with White 80 at 83, followed by Black 82 and White A. White 80 and 84 sacrificed the bottom right corner, but White gained a strong outside position in return. In the process of capturing the corner, Black will lose the stones at 79 and 85.


After playing as far as White 92, Ryu shifted to White 94. Judging by the calmness of this move, he now felt he was back in contention. Black 99 and 101 turned out to be the game-losing moves. Black should have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* to counter White's outer influence. White 104 made the lower left area very big.

Figure 4 (118–268). *Winning a difficult game*

While Black was trimming down White's lower left area, White captured eight black stones. At Black 51, Black had a chance to start

the ko shown in *Dia. 3*, but White had adequate ko threats on the bottom edge, beginning at White 89. Although the endgame seemed to be full of confused fighting, Ryu led all the way. His victory in this unusually difficult game did much to restore his confidence.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.



Dia. 6




Figure 4 (118–268)

45: connects (at 28); 77: connects (at 72);
96: takes three stones (at 84); 125: takes ko
(above 60); 152: connects (right of 56);
161: takes ko (at 155); 163: connects (at 50);
166: takes ko (at 158); 168: connects (at 155)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Commentary by Cho Chikun

At the ceremonies before the first game I let slip the remark 'I expect I'll win.' It could easily have become an empty boast. Fortunately I did win, but now that the match is over, frankly, I feel relieved. After every one of these title series, I just wish that time would stop. That's how glad I am to have gotten through it. I had never played any serious games with Ryu before this match, but of course I had seen his games, so I knew how strong he was. He's already first-rate. I had been expecting him to appear in one of these big title matches before long. His game is wise, which is a little different from saying that it's smart. It has scale and breadth. At the same time, it has a fragile quality, a tendency to come apart in the middle or endgame, which is what I was thinking of when I said what I did. The frightening thing is that despite that fragility, Ryu was able to become the challenger. As the series progressed, I became acutely aware of how frightening Ryu can be. Even after pushing him to 3-1, I had no feeling that I could relax. When he won the fifth game, I felt as if I had my back to a cliff, and then I came completely unstuck on the first day of the sixth game.





Figure 1 (1-19)

Figure 1 (1-19). An attack of nerves

For the first time in the series, Ryu started out on parallel star points. I did the same, because I had something I wanted to try if he continued with a *sanren-sei*. This was to play White 6, then shift to White 8. Ryu could have played Black 7 at A or Black 9 at B — I intended to think about those eventualities if they came up — but he played another move in the top right corner, so I got to make the double approach at White 12 in the lower right. Black 13 to White 18 form a pattern, but Black 19 was a departure, if you want to call it that.

If Black plays the ordinary moves, he'll connect at 1 in *Dia. 1*, and the sequence from White 2 to Black 5 has become a joseki. Black becomes thick, but in gote. Black 19 was played to take sente. I didn't intend to play *Dia. 1*, however, because Black gets very thick, and White 'a' is urgent. I planned to fight with White 2 at 'b', followed by Black 'c', White 'd', Black 5, and White 'e', but then Black made the unexpected move at 19 and I fell victim to my own bad habit of being overly nervous.




How should White answer Black 19? He can't ignore it, because then Black C is too good. One's first instinct is to play at the same point (White C), but I saw a nasty reply to that, so I thought about the hane at White D and cut at White E.


White D is unreasonable in this position. Cutting at White 1 in *Dia. 2* is also bad, as Black squeezes from the outside with 2 and so on. So that leaves only White C, but what does

White do if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3*? If White cuts at 2, Black 7 becomes painfully big.

White has to cut higher, at 2 in *Dia. 4*, or so I thought, but the result through 15 favors Black. That's because White 6 is a misdirected atari. White should just play 1 in *Dia. 5*.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

The sequence through White 9 is reasonable, but it's not so simple if Black first cuts at 2 in *Dia. 6*, then sacrifices his stones. White can refuse the sacrifice by playing 2 to 6 in *Dia. 7*, but I couldn't make up my mind, and time was passing.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7





Figure 2 (20-38)

Figure 2 (20-38). *Thinking in circles*


Without reaching any conclusion, I played White 20, and Ryu immediately played Black 21. He never had any intention of playing

Black A. He said he was afraid of White 21, Black B, White C. So I hadn't been the only one worried; he had had his worries too. All this worrying just proved that I felt on the defensive. I was utterly desolated.




Dia. 8

I didn't want to play White 24. If possible, I wanted to make a pincer like White 1 in *Dia. 8*, but Black would probably play 2 anyway, waiting to see what White did and looking for a chance to play Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. This made me think the correct pincer was the high two-space pincer at White 'c', but Black would still play 2, and then White would have to worry about the fight started by a double approach at Black 'd'. There was no choice but to patiently play White 24. Regardless of whether White played a pincer or not, the move Ryu wanted to make was that shoulder hit at Black 25. He played it near the end of the first day. I would have preferred for him to play it as the sealed move because this, and not White 20, was where I needed to think. I played White 26 and the following moves by fighting spirit and instinct, and gave Black the best possible shape through Black 37. I figured I had lost the game already.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

White 26 was bad. I should have played White 1 in *Dia. 9*. Ryu said he was planning to answer with Black 2, but I was worried about Black 2 and 4 in *Dia. 10*. Black 6 makes Black 'a' and 'b' *miai*. It appears, however, that White could have coped with this by playing White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*.



Dia. 11

Black 31 was a natural and good reply to White 30. Here again I thought about various moves, but White has no satisfactory means of resistance. If I was going to give way with White 32, it would have been much better to do so at White 30, as in *Dia. 12*. In the game, Black got stones at 'a' and 'b' instead of 2, a one-line difference that made it easier for Black to convert his framework into territory. The time when I should have done some hard thinking was after Black 25, not before White 20.



Dia. 12

Figure 3 (39–65). Deciding what to do

Around here it looked bad for White no matter how he played. Ryu must have real-

ized that he was ahead, because he chose comparatively safe moves, like Black 39. Knowing Ryu, I expected Black 62, White A, Black B.

Black 43 was also flexible, preparing to contest the game on territory, instead of relying solely on a framework. Black 43 at 64 would have expanded the framework, but that is the kind of move that can turn sour if not handled carefully. Black 43 also helped defend the right side, threatening to stamp out an invasion around White C with Black D, and of course Black E would be no small move after Black 43.





Figure 3 (39–65)

I thought about playing White 40 one line higher, because of Black's framework, but the way Ryu was cruising along, a weak move like that would have led to obvious defeat. I decided that all I could do was to let him surround a certain amount of territory, then drop a bomb into it. That seemed like the only way to break the game open.

Black answered White 40 at 41, then answered White 44 with relaxed moves from 45 to 51. The center was looking increasingly black. This seemed like the time to drop the bomb.


To find a place to start, I made the contact play at 52. It looked like a long shot, but I meant to give it a try.

Black 53 was the strongest reply. Intercepting at Black 1 in *Dia. 13* is not small, since it leaves Black 'a', but White takes a large profit with 6, and Black's blockade at 5 is a little thin.



Dia. 13


Black 53 and the rest came as expected. Black 57 and 59 were the strongest replies to White 56, and I wasn't sure what to do next.



Dia. 14

In the game I expanded the battlefield with White 60, but my first inclination was to play White 1 in *Dia. 14*. If Black plays 2 at 3, White will extend at 2, and the gap at 'a' and cut at 'b' should help him save his group. Black 2 is, therefore, probably the best reply. White can make one eye in gote with 'b', but it's not clear that he can get another eye in sente after White 7. Note the position of the two marked black stones. The marked white stone had pushed them one line down, so White had that much less space to run around in. The-bigger-the-better is not always true of frameworks. Sometimes the best framework is one that's

not too big. If the marked black stones had been one line farther away, I would have chosen *Dia. 14* without hesitation, instead of playing White 60.



Dia. 15

Black was not likely to answer White 60 at 1 in *Dia. 15*, but if he had, I planned to play White 2 and 4, then abandon the two white stones and start the endgame with a move like White 'a'.

Black naturally resisted with 61, turning up the temperature in this part of the board. Reckless though it might have been, perhaps I should have played White 60 at 1 in *Dia. 14*.



Cho: setting a record for holding the Honinbo title





Figure 4 (66-100) 87: connects at 80

Figure 4 (66-100). Pessimism and reality

The game had entered a phase of total war, provoked by White's meddling at the marked stone. This made the breakthrough at Black 79 and 89 inevitable later, but since I had been behind to begin with, total war was welcome.




Dia. 16

Extending to White 66 was related to the ladder set up by White 76 and 78. Without White 66, the ladder proceeds up to Black 20 in Dia. 16, and Black has White's exits all blocked. If White 19 has been exchanged for Black 'a' before White 1, then after Black 18, White can push out at 20. Now that I think about it, however, White 21 in Dia. 16 might give White a playable game despite Black 20. Black's territory in the center and on the right side is huge, but White's lower side is pretty

big too. This might be a risky result for Black as well as for White. When I asked Ryu afterward, he said he was not planning to play the ladder under any circumstances. He was counting on Black 79 and 89 instead.

White 76 and 78 took one stone, and the double hane at White 80 and 82 and the following squeeze finally gave White prospects for life. Black pushed through at 89 according to plan. What I was afraid of was that Black would cut at 1 in Dia. 17 and attack at 5, but Ryu apparently never even considered this. Perhaps in his judgment, the seven marked white stones were not worth capturing (if Black wanted them, he could capture them by cutting with 1 at 'a').


Pushing through at Black 89 and linking up at 91 were his vision of reality. During the game, I thought I was behind when I connected at White 92, but now that I look again, the game seems fairly even. I can't point to any particularly bad black move, so perhaps White's bombing raid had been a success. I'm the type of person who tends to be swayed by his own feelings, and I've never been able to outgrow this habit.



Dia. 17

During the opening of this game, I ruined my own attitude by thinking about a move I should have played instantly, and playing thoughtlessly when I really needed to think. There was a time in the game when White was clearly behind — I'm still sure of my judgment about that — but it also seems clear that I was more pessimistic than necessary. This pessi-

mism is another habit I can't cure. The feeling that I still had to catch up shows through in White 94. This hane accomplished nothing good; it just helped give Black the white stone on the lower side. If White plays 98 at A, Black plays B and White is beyond salvation. It would have been much better to play White 94 at 1 in *Dia. 18*, leaving good aji and making 'a' and 'b' into miai.



Dia. 18





Figure 5 (101-122)

Figure 5 (101-122). *Plus twenty, minus thirty*


When I played the hane at 94 that left bad aji in the bottom left corner, it was not with the intention of setting bait, but go is unpredictable, and bait is what it became. Bad aji or none, there was no time for a defensive move. White had business elsewhere.

White 4 and 6 were big, and by making the cut at A more menacing, they prepared for action on the right side. Trouble arrived in the expected form of Black 7, threatening Black 11 and B. White 8 abandoned two white stones, but it was probably correct. I thought sente was big enough to be worth the cost of losing those two stones.




Dia. 19

If White doesn't want to give them up, the move to play is White 1 in *Dia. 19*. Black 2 naturally takes the 3-3 point, White plays 3, and now Black 4 looks interesting. White can't expect Black to answer White 3 with the 'joseki' sequence of Black 5, White 'a', Black 'b', White 4, Black 'c', White 'd'. That would be too good to be true. Also, if Black answers White 3 at 6, White plays 4, Black 'e', White 'a', and Black can't live. In short, Black 4 is an excellent move. Black gets to play 8, and his lead is unshakable, even though the corner is still unfinished.




Dia. 20

White can play 1 to 9 in *Dia. 20*, threatening both 'a' and 'b', but Black can deflect this sequence into a ko by answering White 1 with Black 7, White 8, Black 2. He might also answer White 3 by drawing back at 5, and then answer White 'c' by drawing back at 'd'. After letting Black play the marked stone, capturing three stones with 'c' is an uninteresting result for White. For these reasons, I wrote off the two white stones, though they were not small, and sought compensation on the right side by invading at White 14. The long-awaited invasion, it might be called. Judging by results, the sequence through White 22 reversed the lead.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

The cut at White 18, however, was unnecessary. To put it another way, Black had a chance here. He could have played out the sequence that will appear in the bottom left in the next figure, then defended at 1 in Dia. 21. If White plays 2 and so on, Black gives up the marked stones. This seems to leave Black ahead, so White's correct move was to omit 18 and play 20 immediately.


Dia. 22 shows the variation in which Black answers White 20 by blocking. White wedges in at 4, and it appears that he can manage in one way or another. The sequence up to White 12 is one example. White wins the capturing race.

Afterwards, Ryu said, 'I gained about twenty points in the bottom left corner (by cutting at Black 11), but lost about thirty on the right side (White 14 etc.). No wonder I lost the game.' Those figures may not be accurate, but it's a fact that White profited on the exchange. In that sense, leaving Black the opportunity to play 7 was baiting a trap. It might have been correct for Black to play 11 at C.

Figure 6 (123-164). A lucky win

The sequence from Black 23 to White 34 was Black's sente privilege in the bottom left, which is why capturing the two white stones was not small, but the right side had been transformed from black territory into white territory. Ryu had reason to moan. Note that if Black plays 27 at 28 he can take three white stones, but following White A, Black 31, White 32, and Black 29, White can link up with a

hane at 33, so Black doesn't gain. The sequence in the figure is correct.



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
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An Introduction to Tesuji (vii)


by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series, for novice players, covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. In the last instalment we showed you some tesujis that kill groups. In this issue we are going to give you some examples of tesujis that can give your stones life. First try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples begin on the next page.




Problem 1. Black to play

The move to save the black stones may be hard to see, but it often arises in actual play.



Problem 2. Black to play

If Black can get a seki, he will have succeeded in making life.



Problem 3. Black to play

You have to see two moves ahead to solve this problem. The answer is not a ko.


Stopping the Monkey Jump (i)

The monkey jump is probably the best-known of all endgame tesujis. There is even a proverb which says, 'The monkey jump is worth eight points.' This evaluation, however, cannot be completely relied upon. Depending on the position, its value can sometimes be more and sometimes less. Nevertheless, the monkey jump is a big endgame move, and the side that plays it usually ends in sente.


Once you have played a monkey jump into your opponent's territory, the onus is upon him to contain it and keep the damage to a minimum. This is sometimes tricky, but by the time you finish studying this two-part article, you should be able to correctly defend against this tesuji in any position.

First of all, look at the three problems below. White has made a large knight's move on the first line (this move is the monkey jump)


in these problems. In *Problem 1*, Black's position is quite thick on the left, but in *Problem 2* (next page), Black is a bit thin (his main backup stone is the marked one). In *Problem 3* (next page), not only must Black stop White's monkey jump, but he must also be careful not to endanger his six-stone group in the corner. Answers start on page 57.



Problem 1



Problem 2



Problem 3


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Problem 1. Playing on the vital point


It is often the case that the point where your opponent would play to kill your stones is the same place you would play to make them live. In fact, there is a go proverb which says: 'My opponent's vital point is my vital point.' This proverb is applicable in this problem.

Dia. 1. The vital point

Black 1 is the vital point. Black now has an eye in the corner, and he can get his second eye at 'a' or 'b'.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Don't connect!


The key to solving this problem is to see from the start that Black must not connect at 3 in answer to White 1. Instead, Black plays 2. When White captures two stones with 3 —

Dia. 3. Recapture

Black can recapture a stone with 1. His group now has an eye on the left and on the right.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black dies.


If Black plays 1, White will strike at the vital point with 2, leaving Black with only one eye. If White 2 at 'a', Black plays 3 at 2 and lives as in *Dias. 2 and 3*.

Dia. 5. Another example

Black lives in this position in much the same way he did in *Dia. 1*. White has just played the marked stone, which seems to leave Black with a false eye.




Dia. 5




Dia. 7. Can't connect.

White 1 looks promising, but after Black 2, White is left without a follow-up. If White connects at 'a', Black captures three stones with 'b', and Black has enough room to make his second eye.




Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. Failure

Capturing with Black 1 fails. White hanes with 2, then destroys Black's eye shape with 4.



Dia. 9

Dia. 9. Not enough space.


Black might try to expand his eye by descending with 1, but White 2 strikes at the vital point. If Black 3 at 4, White will answer at 3, and Black's second eye is a false one.

Problem 2. Seki also makes life.


If a group of stones is to live, it usually has to have two eyes, but sometimes it can live without two eye in a *seki*.

Dia. 1. The vital point

When Black attaches at the center of the three white stones with 1, White is unable to move.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black lives in seki


After *Dia. 1*, if White fills the two black liberties with the marked stones, White still cannot play inside. If he does, Black will get eye shape.

Dia. 3. Dead shape

If Black pushes inside with 1, White answers with 2. If Black captures with 3 —



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black is dead.


White places a stone in the middle of Black's big eye, and Black cannot make two eyes.

Dia. 5. Example 1

This is a basic life-and-death problem on the side. Black doesn't have enough space to make two eyes. How can he get a *seki*?



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. The only move


Black 1 is the move that gives Black a *seki*.

Dia. 7. Seki

White destroys Black's eyes with 1 and 3, but after Black 4, White must connect with 5 and settle for a *seki*.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8 Black is dead.


Expanding the eye space with Black 1 may seem like a good idea, but Black is reduced to one eye after White plays 2 and 4.

Dia. 9. Example 2

Here is another example. Again, the only way Black can live is by creating a *seki*.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 10. Correct answer


Black 1 is the correct move. The points 'a' and 'b' become miai; that is, if White plays on one of them, Black will play on the other.

Dia. 11. Seki

For example, if White 1, Black will play 2. White cannot move inside without giving Black a living eye shape, so the result is a *seki*.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 12. Failure


If Black 1, White ends up with a dead eye shape after White 2 and 4. If Black captures the white stones, White will play back at the point 4, and Black is dead.

Problem 3. Suffocating your opponent


There are times when it looks as if the result will be a ko, but actually it is not. If you can look one move ahead, you can take the breath away from your opponent's stones.

Dia. 1. It is not a ko!

First Black throws in with 1. White captures with 2, and it looks like a ko, but —



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black is alive.


Black next plays 1. White cannot defend at 'a' because of the rule against suicide. Therefore, Black will eventually be able to capture at 'a', making two perfect eyes.

Dia. 3. The difference a liberty makes

If White has played the marked stone, however, Black will be short of liberties. Therefore, Black cannot play at 'a' after White 2 without putting himself into atari, so he has to fight the ko in order to live.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Another example

The problem here is to capture the three white stones. The technique used in *Dia. 1* is again applicable.

Dia. 5. The throw in

Black throws in with 1, forcing White to capture with 2. Again, it looks like a ko fight, but —



Dia. 5


Dia. 6. White is paralyzed

Black next ataris with 1. Since White is unable to connect at 'a', Black can capture four white stones here to make two eyes.


Dia. 7 Black is dead.

The atari of Black 1 lets White play on the vital point of 2. Eventually, Black must capture at 'a', but this leaves him with a dead four-space eye shape.

(Let's Go, July 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)




Dia. 6



Dia. 7


Stopping the Monkey Jump: Answers

Answer to Problem 1




Dia. 1. Correct Answer

The diagonal attachment is the correct way for Black to stop White from making any further inroads into his territory. Next —



Dia. 2. Continuation


White has no alternative but to draw back with 2. Black now blocks with 3 and White must defend with 4. After Black ataris with 5, Black connects with 7 and the exchange comes to an end.



Dia. 3. Unreasonable

You may wonder why White doesn't extend to 2. The reason is that Black 3 cuts the two white stones off from their allies on the left. Black 3 and the marked stone make a strong connection that White can't break. That is, White can't cut at 'a', so his two stones on the right have no chance to live. White has suffered a huge loss.


Let's look at various ways Black can go wrong.



Dia. 4. Failure 1


Blocking with Black 1 would have been a good move before White made the monkey

jump, but now White can link up with his stone on the right by playing 2.




Dia. 5. Unstoppable

Black tries to contain White with 3, but he pushes into Black's territory with 4 and 6.




Dia. 6. Failure 2

Trying to sacrifice a stone with Black 1 may seem to be a tesuji, but here it leads to failure.




Dia. 7. Continuation

Black can block White from entering the territory on the right with the sequence to 13, but Black has seven points less territory than in *Dia. 2*.




Dia. 8. Failure 3

Attaching with Black 1 is unreasonable. White ataris with 2. Next —




Dia. 9. Continuation 8: connects

After White captures with 4, Black has to give way with 5. Black ends with three points less than in the correct answer (*Dia. 2*).



Dia. 10. Failure 4


Black 1 is a slack move. This gives White the chance to push with 2. White's result is again inferior to *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 11. Failure 5

Black 1 is the correct move, but if Black plays 3, he needlessly gives away two points. Again, compare this result with *Dia. 2*.


Answer to Problem 2



Dia. 1. Correct Answer 8: connects at 3


Dia. 1. Correct Answer

This time the diagonal move of Black 1 is the move to stop the monkey jump. White draws back with 2, but then the attachment of Black 3 is a tesuji. With the diagonal connection of 9, White's intrusion is successfully blocked.




Dia. 2. Failure 1

In this position, the attachment of Black 1 does not work. When Black hanes with 3, White ataris with 4 and Black cannot stop the two white stones on the right from linking up.




Dia. 3. The reason

If Black does not have a stone at 'a', then a move at 'b' will not stop the monkey jump.




Dia. 4. Failure 2

The diagonal move at Black 1 also fails. White can push once at 2, then fall back to 4. Compared to Dia. 1, this is at least a two-point loss.



Dia. 5. Failure 3


Weak players, perhaps out of fear, often fall back as far as Black 1, but after White 2 and 4, Black's loss is even greater than it was in Dia. 4.



Dia. 6. Failure 4


Black 1 is a bad move. After White 2, the sequence from 3 to 7 is now the only way to stop Black.

Answer to Problem 3




Dia. 1. Failure 1

If it were only necessary to stop the monkey jump, Black 1 would accomplish it, but Black has to consider the life of his stones in the corner.




Dia. 2. A brilliant move

After Black blocks with 3, White descends to 4. This is a brilliant move which contains a double threat. Next —




Dia. 4. Failure 2

Black 1 doesn't work either. Black successfully defends his territory on the right side, but White has been able to play 6 and he then kills the black corner group with 8.




Dia. 3. Black's corner stones die

If Black defends his territory on the right by connecting at 5, White kills the stones in the corner with the placement of 6.




Dia. 5. Failure 3

The diagonal move of Black 1 does not endanger the corner, but White can reduce Black's territory by crawling at 2. After Black 3, White will defend with 4 and Black connects at 5.




Reference Diagram

Without a white stone at 'a', the placement of White 1 does not kill the black stones. After Black 4, there is no way that White can stop Black from getting two eyes.




Dia. 6. Failure 4

Black can attach at 1, then sacrifice this stone with the sequence to 5. However, there is a better way.




Dia. 7. Correct Answer

Black should simply attach at 1. This is the tesuji that stops the monkey jump and does not endanger the black group in the corner.




Dia. 9. Nothing to worry about

You might be worried about White 2, but with the marked stone in place, it is a bad move.



Dia. 8. A quiet move

Drawing back with White 1 is a quiet move. Black must not play 3 at 'a', otherwise White will play as in Dia. 2, descending to 4 there.



Dia. 10. The explanation

Black can atari with 3. After Black 5, the white stones are dead. If White 4 at 'a', Black ataris at 4; Black's stones are connected while White's are dead.

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
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New Moves and New Josekis

Tempting Black to Push Through

by Abe Yoshiteru

The position in the figure is from a game between Kato Masao 9-dan (white) and Yuki Satoshi 8-dan, played on February 9, 1995 in the Honinbo league. Later in the year, Kato managed to beat Yuki in the playoff to become the challenger, but he lost this game. As readers of this magazine know Kato is one of the top players in Japan, and even though he hasn't won any titles recently in 1995, he had a very high winning percentage. Yuki is a strong fighter and he is quickly establishing himself as one of the top Japanese players.




Figure


The position in lower left corner resulted from a double-approach joseki against the white stone on the star point. White extended to 1, which seemed like a passive move. This is probably why this move was never played by professionals.

Dia. 1 (the turning point)

The position resulted from the double approach moves of 1 and 3. In response to White 4 and 6, Black extended to 7 and pushed at 9, trying to get sente so as to play in the last empty corner in the upper left. Since the push at 9 is an unusual move, I will explain it more fully.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (preventing the push)

White 1 prevents Black from pushing through at 'a', but Black gains thickness with 2, 4, and 6. This result is not bad for Black.

Dia. 3 (taking both sides)


Black could also take territory with 2 and 4 on the left. White now has to play the hane at 5 and Black can make an extension with 6 and 8 at the bottom. Again Black is not dissatisfied with this result. Black could even play 6 at 7, preventing White from getting thickness in the center.




Dia. 3

Dia. 4 (outside thickness)


To prevent Black from pushing through, White 1 and 3 might seem good, but Black can surround the white group by cutting with 4. After 5, if White cuts at 7, Black will sacrifice two stones. The result to Black 12 is not favorable for White. If White plays 7 at 'a', extending into the center, Black will defend with 'b', getting influence on both sides.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Dia. 5 (the double hane)


If White wants to make thickness in the center, he should hane at 1, but the double hane at White 3 is bad, since Black can force White into an inefficient clump of stones with the sequence to 12. Instead of the double hane at 3, White should attach at 12. Black can respond with either 3 or 'a'.

Dia. 6 (territory vs. thickness)

Black can also immediately push through with 2 and make an exchange to White 15. This sequence is almost inevitable. If White played 3 at 4, Black would atari at 3 and White would not have a good response.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (what happened in the game)


Black pushed through with 1. Up to White 8, the result was territory vs. thickness. This exchange was almost even, but I think it was slightly more profitable for Black.

Dia. 8 (White's options)


In response to Black 1, White had two options. One was to simply extend at 2, then to turn at 4. This gives White thickness in the center, but Black gets positions on both sides, so Black is also satisfied. If Black continues to push at 4 after 2, White will pincer at 'a'.

Dia. 9 (the territorial option)

The other option was White 2 and 4, going for territory. Even though Black confines White to the corner with the sequence to 9, White gets both territory and sente. After this, White will answer Black 'a' with 'c', so Black 'b' will not be a forcing move. If Black 3 at 'a', the two black stones will be forced to live in a low position.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 10 (bad shape)

Instead of White 2 in Dia. 7, if White blocks with 1, a cut at Black 2 will force White into a disadvantageous fight. The white group in the corner can make life up to 9, but the white stones in the center are too heavy. If White cuts at 'a' instead of 3, Black would play 4 and 6, making miai of 'b' and 'c'.


Dia. 11 (a necessary defensive move)

An alternative to White 4 in Dia. 7 is to block with 1, but the cut at Black 2 is severe. The white group in the corner has to make life with 3 and White has to answer Black 4 with 5. After Black 6, a black defense at 'a' is unnecessary.


Instead of 3, White can exchange 4 for Black 'a', but he still needs one more move to defend his group in the corner.

Dia. 12 (counterattack)

White might counterattack by cutting at 3. If Black carelessly plays a hane at 4, the black stones will be captured by White 5, 7, and 9.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Dia. 13 (rush to kill)


Instead of Black 4 in *Dia. 12*, Black should atari with 1, then hane at 3. When White plays 6, Black rushes to kill White's group in the corner with 9 after exchanging Black 7 for White 8. If White 6 at 'a', Black plays 7, then, after White 8, attaches at 6, killing the White's stones in the corner. Black's group at the bottom is already alive: if White 'b', Black will play 'a'.

Dia. 14 (a foolish response)

After Black 9 in the last diagram, if White descends to 1, Black continues his attack with 2 and 4. If White wants to save his group, the only way is to play 'a', followed by Black 'b'—White 'c', creating a ko fight. But it is foolish for White to play like this. Therefore, the sequence in the game was unavoidable for White.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 15 (a comparison)

If White pincers with 2 when Black approaches with 1, the result up to 14 is good for White. But the outcome in the game was different: instead of a stone at 2, White ended up with one at 'a'. Later, Black 'b' and 'c', and White 'd' were added. These exchanges were

good for

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Invincible: The Games of Shusaku

Compiled, edited, and translated by John Power

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Shusaku's games are considered the best model for aspiring professional players to study, especially his games with black. He was unexcelled in his complete mastery of the strategic principles and the practical techniques of go. His games are a treasure house of all the varied elements of the game, from the fuseki to the endgame, but in particular they provide amateur players with ideal material for studying the art of fighting in the middle game.

Here are some 20th century views of Shusaku:

'Shusaku simplified the complexity of go, concealing his great strength and profound analysis beneath the smooth surface of his game... It is not an exaggeration to say that all the principles and all the techniques of go are embodied in concentrated form in Shusaku's go.' — Segoe Kensaku 9-dan

The speed and forcefulness of Shusaku's play with black are like lightning striking the go board; his skill at finishing off his opponent once he took the lead is unrivalled.' — Hayashi Yutaka, go historian

'Shusaku would read out all the possible variations, then play straightforwardly, making the simplest move, if he thought it ensured a win. This way of playing is only possible if one has a clear understanding of the principles of go and is blessed with superb positional judgment, and it also requires considerable self-confidence. On those rare occasions when he got into a bad position, he would display tremendous strength in fighting his way back into the lead. The castle game with Ito Showa in 1850 is a good example of a game in which he reveals his latent strength... Another feature of his go is his flexibility and willingness to experiment. Modern go is still far from surpassing Shusaku.' — Ishida Yoshio, former Meijin, Honinbo

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